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Abstract
When programming network functions, changes within a
packet tend to have consequences—side effects which must
be accounted for by network programmers or administrators
via arbitrary logic and an innate understanding of dependen-
cies. Examples of this include updating checksums when a
packet’s contents has been modified or adjusting a payload
length field of a IPv6 header if another header is added or
updated within a packet. While static-typing captures inter-
face specifications and how packet contents should behave,
it does not enforce precise invariants around runtime depen-
dencies like the examples above. Instead, during the design
phase of network functions, programmers should be given
an easier way to specify checks up front, all without having
to account for and keep track of these consequences at each
and every step during the development cycle. In keeping
with this view, we present a unique approach for adding
and generating both static checks and dynamic contracts for
specifying and checking packet processing operations. We
develop our technique within an existing framework called
NetBricks and demonstrate how our approach simplifies and
checks common dependent packet and header processing
logic that other systems take for granted, all without adding
much overhead during development.
CCS Concepts
• Networks→ Programming interfaces.
Keywords
network functions, design-by-contract, software verification
1 Introduction
Writing network functions (NFs) today is as capable as ever,
with numerous frameworks and domain-specific languages
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to choose from. Some target development ease, reusable ab-
stractions, or a familiar programming model that is in vogue
within software development at large, while others stress per-
formance guarantees or deployment at scale. Irrespective of
which framework or model is used, NFs tend to be comprised
of code exercising arbitrary logic and domain knowledge
that only network programmers or administrators would
know, or should know.
Consider the payload length field of an IPv6 header, a
field whose value is dependent upon the consequence of
processing and manipulating the rest of the packet it’s a part
of. If an extension header [6] is added to or removed from
the packet, or a layer 4 protocol’s payload is modified in any
way, then this payload length field must be incremented or
decremented accordingly. Other “middleboxes” downstream
in the network will apply functionality based on the value
held in this field—without calculating the length of the rest
of the packet—or just drop the packet outright if it’s wrong.
Handling this effect is often taken for granted, a piece of
arbitrary logic that network programmers have to remember
to apply and validate at different steps in a function pipeline
or at egress. For example, in the still widely used [9, 18,
24] packet processing system Click [21], a CheckIP6Header
module provides validation on the payload length field via:
1 if(ntohs(ip->ip6_plen) > (plen - 40 ))
2 goto bad ;
While this code does do a “check” on the field, it hard codes
the value as part the conditional check instead of using a con-
stant or variable to better express meaning ( 40 is the fixed
size of an IPv6 header). Additionally, if the check is invalid,
goto bad executes a jump, leaving very little in the way of
failure handling and unambiguous messaging. Besides a few
per-field validations within the element file, the module does
not account for related changes downstreamwhen composed
with other modules or the possibility of extension headers
or variable-length fields. The functionality expressed in this
snippet need not be so unwieldy, as validations should be a
first-class part of programmable network architecture.
In this paper, we present a novel approach that clearly de-
scribes and validates these arbitrary effects via the addition
and generation of both static checks and dynamic, runtime
contracts for specifying conditional dependencies in com-
mon packet processing actions. Our work makes use of three
well-known programming paradigms.
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Static Assertions and Types Our prototype is incorpo-
rated within a framework built using the Rust programming
language, which emphasizes a strong, static type system
with first-class polymorphism [32] (parametric and ad-hoc).
Headers within a packet are explicitly-typed, e.g. Ipv4Hdr or
Ipv6Hdr for instance, and contain associated types [8] that
define which header(s) can precede it, e.g. an IPv6 Header re-
lies on an Ethernet header existing before it within a packet.
We leverage the type system along with the concept of static
assertions [19] to provide compile-time checking for a subset
of network function components, including constant checks
at the call site of these functions and ensuring that packet
order and definitions adhere to specification.
Design by Contract We take inspiration from D’s con-
tract system [12], whose design was inspired by contract
schemes [25] where contracts are provided and run dur-
ing testing, debugging, and development stages—the design
phase—but are usually omitted for release builds in order to
maximize performance. In using this style of contracts, pro-
grammers are able to code, test, and simulate NF’s around pre
(ingress) and post (egress) invariants, checking which con-
ditions must hold as packets are transformed by functions.
These contracts allow developers to identify the intentional
consequences of their packet processing algorithms.
Code Generation Though contract programming aids in
checking and asserting if specifications and dependencies be-
tween operations hold, these checks are only (recommended
to be) provided during time of development or within testing
environments. Additionally, we do not want developers to
have to sprinkle contracts throughout their NFs or implement
logic to traverse or backtrack from one header, payload, or
set of bytes to another just for the sake of validation. Instead,
our approach allows developers to specify a set of dependen-
cies and conditions up front via macros [20], which in turn
get translated into contracts.
We develop our technique as an extension to the NetBricks
framework and programming model [29], illustrating the ef-
ficacy of our approach through two examples: 1) updating
the IPv6 payload length of a packet in the context of changes
to an extension header; and 2) transitioning an invalid TCP
request (based on an MTU—Maximum Transmission Unit—
threshold), into that of an ICMPv6 Packet Too Big response
[5]. We evaluate our prototype by examining syntax addi-
tions, compilation times, and possible runtime overheads.
In Section 6, we discuss our examples within the context of
a couple real-world implementations, Onos and Facebook
network code, where our approach could be beneficial.
2 Motivation
Choosing between NF architectures and/or network pro-
gramming languages has become a non-trivial process: What
kind of programming paradigm should one choose for packet
processing, e.g. functional, dataflow, or imperative? Should
the framework support the OpenFlow protocol or be com-
posed of its own data plane and control plane layers? What
are the most important facets of the system or application:
performance, usability and reconfiguration, reliability? There
are many choices and abstractions to deliberate on, see sec-
tions 6 and 1, yet most only provide a subset of safety, design
benefits, or degrees of freedom for which kinds of applica-
tions can be executed. We illustrate two specific challenges
in defining a better way forward.
The Limits of Correctness In the interest of handling
correctness and ensuring network programs satisfy speci-
fication, there are several efforts which have experimented
with verifying networking constructs. For example, a lan-
guage like NetKat [3], based on proven semantic and type
theoretic foundations, provides static checking for reachabil-
ity, guarantees non-interference between programs, and sup-
ports first-class primitives for the filtering, modifying, and
transmitting of packets. However, though powerful, NetKat
is limited in what logic it can check for and what protocols
and actions it can support, as all programs must conform
to the OpenFlow flow table—its compilation target. While
OpenFlow is used in practice, its model is limited in terms of
interface, protocol, and field support, especially for newer,
experimental features. Due to this coupling with OpenFlow,
along with a lack for handling arbitrary logic in packet pro-
cessing, NetKat does not present a generalized solution.
Arbitrary Logic & Variable-length Data As described
in Section 1, many network programs contain operational
logic that’s only applied based on the IETF or similar specifi-
cations they conform to. Some even define their own inspired-
by protocols without a formalized spec [17]. One major com-
ponent of the IPv6 protocol specification that has been left un-
supported by many NF frameworks is that of IPv6 extension
headers. Traffic containing such a header is usually dropped
in practice and considered a “threat to the Internet” [15]. In
skipping support for extension headers, packet-processing
paradigms can avoid dealing with variable-length data—the
specs of these headers contain fields with variable-byte-sized
data—and complex header chaining dependencies, as these
headers can be stacked upon each other to no end. How-
ever, as unique applications for programmable networks that
make use of these extensions are constantly being explored
[7], we must provide programmatic abstractions for adher-
ing to the conditions of these protocols while also being
amenable to new, experimental ones down the line whether
they’re used in industry or proposed in research.
3 Kinds of Contracts
3.1 Design by Contract
The Eiffel programming language made design by contract
first-class, focusing primarily on how runtime contracts can
be turned on for monitoring and testing situations so that
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developers can “sit back, and just watch their contracts be
violated” [26]. The key idea behind the approach is that el-
ements of a software system collaborate with each other
on the basis of mutual obligations and benefits, driven by
dependencies and related components in the system. These
contracts are usually separated into pre (input/ingress) and
post conditions (output/egress), where invariants can be as-
serted on for incoming and outgoing data accordingly.
In our system, design by contract-styled assertions help
programmers articulate what the values of fields in a header
should be equal to, bound by, approximate to, or how these
values may have shifted during packet transformation (e.g.
swapping of MAC addresses). From a processing perspective,
the input precondition runs when the packet enters a NF and
the postcondition runs as the packet is exiting the function.
3.2 Static Assertions
Static assertions, popularized in the C, C++, and D languages,
allow for compile-time assertions of statically defined expres-
sions, e.g. constants, statics. Beyond just checking for specific
values, static assertions can be used to enforce fields on struct
types and check if a pointer’s underlying value is the same
when coerced to another type. NF programs tend to be com-
prised of many constants referring to values derived from
specifications. For example, the IPv6 minimumMTU value is
1280 [6], but is actually 1294 in practice when the Ethernet
header is included. Our approach can check this caveat stati-
cally at the call site where the NF is defined—not where it’s
instantiated—via compile-time assertions in our prototype
for constant checking. Additionally, thanks to conditional
compilation (see 4.1 for more information), static assertions
remain in release binaries.
3.3 Static Order-Persevering Headers
With our approach implemented in NetBricks, we were given
a head start toward better validationmechanics with a strong,
static type system and framework for programming NFs in a
map-reduce fashion. To add packet headers in NetBricks, you
define a struct with the appropriate fields, as you would do in
C or P4 for example. All structs must implement a trait1 con-
taining an associated type that is defined as PreviousHdr:
1 impl EndOffset for Ipv6Hdr {
2 type PreviousHdr=EthHdr ;
3 fn offset(&self) -> usize { 40 }
4 }
When parsing a packet within an NF, the order is guar-
anteed by the defined PreviousHdr . Given any other order
(e.g. parsing an IPv6 header after a ICMPv6 header), the type
checker will throw a compile-time error. In our prototype,
1Traits are used to define shared behavior in Rust, similar to interfaces in
other languages [8].
we leverage this statically-defined order mechanism on head-
ers (4) to ensure that incoming and outgoing packet header
ordering is preserved according to encoded expectations.
4 Implementation
We have developed a prototype2 that extends the NetBricks
programming model via macro-based metaprogramming
with very little additional syntax. Instead of having to manu-
ally incorporate or implement all of the contract methodolo-
gies described in section 3 throughout a NF code base, our
contracts extension can be used gradually, i.e. on certain NFs
and not others, as well as retroactively on existing NFs with
just a few easy steps: (i.) import our check library into an
NF module; then (ii.) identify an NF to validate, and mark it;
and then (iii.) specify contracts at the beginning and end of a
NF based on properties that the developer wants to uphold.
Once introduced, these contracts rewrite NFs to include
mechanisms for storing runtime info (used for checking out-
going packets), generating validations, assertions, logging
facilities, and flag checks for conditional compilation.
Initialization As seen in Figure 1, the check attribute
macro (surrounded by brackets) is responsible for three steps
in the contract generation process. Firstly, it identifies that
the developer wants this NF to be “checked,” which means it
can be used gradually over time. Secondly, by designating
that this function has contract-checking on, we are then
able to parse specific keywords, i.e. pre, post, in the figure
that we want to rewrite and generate assertions from. Lastly,
it performs a series of initialization operations, including
turning-on specialized logging facilities and lazily instantiat-
ing a runtime hashmap that’s used to store all the headers
as part of the input packet to create a mirror of the contents
of the packet entering the NF. Building this map allows us
to store header information for tracing, analysis, and further
checks throughout the processing lifecycle, all the while pro-
ducing a series of iterative steps to parse through the packet
header-by-header, based on the order specified by the code.
Macro Expansion The generation of code from macros
ingress_check! and egress_check! occurs prior to the NF pro-
gram being subjected to Rust’s type-checker, i.e. occurring in
a separate compilation step. Of note, the order key in both
the pre and post assertions, specified by the developer, allows
us to match on the header-order within the contents of the
packet itself, as all parsing of headers requires explicit type
annotations in NetBricks under the hood. If the expected
order does not match up on either ingress or egress checks,
a compile-time error is thrown (as per 3.3).
Ingress and Egress Contracts Figure 1 exhibits how con-
tracts are extended into an NF. This example checks if an
incoming TCP packet is beyond the valid MTU threshold,
2Openly accessible as a branch on Github.
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#[ check (IPV6_MIN_MTU = 1280)]
fn send_too_big {
.pre(box pkt {
ingress_check! {
input: pkt,
order : [EthHdr=>Ipv6Hdr=>TcpHdr<Ipv6Hdr>],
checks: [( payload_len[Ipv6Hdr] , >,
IPV6_MIN_MTU )]
}})
...filter/map/group_by operations...
.post(box pkt {
egress_check! {
input: pkt,
order :[EthHdr=>Ipv6Hdr=>Icmpv6PktTooBig<...>],
checks:[( checksum[Icmpv6PktTooBig] , neq,
checksum[TcpHdr<Ipv6Hdr>] ),
( payload_len[Ipv6Hdr] , ==, 1240 ),
( src[Ipv6Hdr] , ==, dst[Ipv6Hdr] ),
( dst[Ipv6Hdr] , ==, src[Ipv6Hdr] ),
( .src[EthHdr] , ==, .dst[EthHdr] ),
( .dst[EthHdr] , ==, .src[EthHdr] )]
}})
Figure 1: Pre and Post contracts on MTU example
and, if so, then rewrites the packet into that of an ICMPv6
Packet Too Big response which gets returned to the source
sender. As mentioned, the incoming and outgoing order
lists reveal how the packet should be transformed through-
out the main body of the function. Egress checks compare
the values of fields and functions on the current, outgoing
packet ( left-hand side of each check ) to values that are ei-
ther literal integers or integer expressions, or functions or
fields from the original, incoming packet ( right-hand side ).
In this example, if it has to return to sender, this means swap-
ping Ethernet addresses and IPv6 source and destination
addresses from the original input. The checks presented here
would fail or throw errors if the inner body’s logic did not
account for these swap operations.
4.1 Conditional Compilation
As previously mentioned, design by contract systems were
devised with the intention that contracts would be applied
during simulation, testing, and debugging stages of develop-
ment. Our approach combines these kinds of runtime, dy-
namic assertions, which capture arbitrary logic and values,
with static assertions and compile-time type checking. As
shown in our evaluation of the runtime cost of our prototype,
5.3, runtime-checking and initialization accrue a penalty,
which is manageable during NF development, not production.
We leverage Rust’s compile-time feature-flags [33] to only
generate dynamic, runtime contracts for debug and testing
modes, while ensuring all static information and assertions
remain in the finalized, production program binaries.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the possible overheads of our
approach, including profiling its runtime cost by sampling
the call graph during a packet’s run through an NF.
Setup In our experimental setup, we ran NetBricks within
an Ubuntu Docker container on a local VirtualBox VM. Net-
Bricks uses DPDK [29] for fast packet I/O, which we have
properly set up within the VM and container. We used Moon-
Gen [10] to generate varying packet captures (pcaps) for our
testing and evaluation harness. We looked at three factors
in evaluating our technique for the design of NFs: (i.) addi-
tional syntax (LoC—lines of code); (ii.) compilation-time
added to our two example NFs; (iii.) and runtime overhead
of ingress and egress contract generation.
5.1 Syntax Added
LoC run lang files lines code
mtu-too-big: Contracts ON rust 2 214 183
mtu-too-big: Contracts OFF rust 2 189 158
mtu-too-big: Contracts ON toml 1 19 16
mtu-too-big: Contracts OFF toml 1 16 13
mtu-too-big: Contracts ON total 3 233 199
mtu-too-big: Contracts OFF total 3 205 171
Change 0 +28 +28
Table 1: Syntax additions for our MTU NF (unexpanded)
Being that most of the work in our implementation is
centered around the macro generation of contracts, it’s not
surprising to see that our non-expanded measure of LoC
(Table 1) is minimal. We import a few libraries (crates in the
Rust ecosystem), including our check library, into NetBricks.
The extra crates are used for logging and assertion control
around error handling and operations that we can match on.
Minus boilerplate, most of the additional code comes from
the specifications themselves, as there is no bound on the
number of possible validations that can be added.
In Table 1, we choose to show LoC without expansion, to
faithfully represent the experience of the network function
developer. At the outset of this project, we wanted to avoid
altering many of the core NetBricks APIs or its existing
example NFs. With our contract generation prototype, we
increased our examples’ programs and build configurations
by an average of 23 lines, or less than 10 percent.
5.2 Compilation Times
One of the most important factors we wanted to consider
was compilation time, as we did not want programmers
to pay much of a penalty while developing NFs. Table 2
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compile times / cargo build example mean (s) stddev (s) user (s) system (s) min (s) max (s)
Contracts - Off srv6-change-pkt 26.039 3.286 0.631 10.715 22.330 33.230
Contracts - On srv6-change-pkt 25.099 2.398 0.549 11.697 20.238 28.220
Effect -0.94 -0.888 -0.082 +0.982 -2.092 -5.01
Contracts - Off mtu-too-big 21.652 2.202 0.537 9.201 18.528 25.191
Contracts - On mtu-too-big 26.052 1.858 0.650 10.851 22.165 28.346
Effect +4.4 -0.344 +0.113 +1.65 +3.637 +3.155
Table 2: Compile times running “cargo build” for extension header NF example and MTU NF example
compares our two example network function cases with
contract generation turned on and off. For each of these runs,
the build was compiled from a warm, incremental cache and
then rebuilt from that cache ten times. As shown, with our
contract generation system applied, the standard deviation
across all builds was less than a second overall. Further, mean
time even improved in the case of our extension header
example. Though there is room for optimization, these results
show that our technique doesn’t negatively affect developers
during development.
5.3 Runtime Cost
We’ve discussed how our objective for programmers is to be
able to specify their checks up front as they build out NFs
and test them. Knowing all of the initialization and setup we
have to concoct on behalf of the contract engine, we were
aware that the runtime cost would be problematic if the NF
ran in production. But, how problematic would it be?
For this evaluation, we ran our invalid MTU example and
sent a packet at a time through it, tracing the call graph
throughout the function and sampling it. To trace and vi-
sualize the effect, we used the Flame Graph approach [14],
popularized in industry. The graph is illustrated in Figure 2.
As expected, our precondition routine takes up a majority
of the function’s execution time. This is mainly due to creat-
ing a copy of the incoming packet and parsing each header
within it. Our egress macro, for example, does much less and
spans less of the execution graph.
Further optimizing our implementation’s code generation
and how we store and parse the packet in the evaluated
program would lessen the runtime cost of our technique in
practice and eventually make it possible to include some
dynamic contracts for in-production use-cases. Nonetheless,
as we’ve stated before, to focus our technique on the de-
sign phase of NF writing, the current version of the library
compiles away most of this generated code upon production
builds—not slowing down the runtime.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Thus far, we’ve demonstrated our technique on a few simple
yet practical NF examples. In this section, we discuss how
our work could benefit practical programs and applications
out in the wild. Then, we explore where we want to take the
approach going forward.
6.1 Real-World Example: ONOS Routing
One of the cases we’ve evaluated includes adding additional
segments to a IPv6 segment routing extension header [11].
In Section 2, we mentioned that IPv6 extension headers were
difficult to handle due to their variability, causing network
operators to write rules to drop packets that contain them
and NF frameworks avoiding their logic altogether. ONOS
[4], the open network operating system, is a controller plat-
form supporting a wide variety of SDN use cases, including
support for the Routing header extension. Nonetheless, the
most complex logic that the header entails is that of adding
and removing segments, which then triggers effects on the
Last Entry (the index into the stack of segments) and Seg-
ments Left (the number of route segments remaining to be
processed) fields. These triggered events provide a good story
for our implementation because the ONOS class [1] does not
account for changes in the Routing header stack; instead, it
just works on aminimal set of fields for reading these headers
along the network path. With an approach like the one we’ve
exhibited in our paper, more assurance could be given for
handling the complex logic of variable-length information.
6.2 Real World Example: Katran
Katran [30] is Facebook’s Layer 4 software load balancer,
built on a data plane using the eBPF VM. While Katran is
deployed at scale and processes packets at high speeds, its
codebase lacks specifications and checks in logic; it also
includes many hardcoded values and a myriad of constants.
Similar to the invalid MTU example used throughout this
paper, they too have a IPv6 Packet Too Big response function:
1 static inline int send_icmp6_too_big(...) {
2 ...
3 icmp6_hdr->icmp6_type = ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG;
4 icmp6_hdr->icmp6_mtu = htonl(
5 MAX_PCKT_SIZE -sizeof(struct eth_hdr)
6 )}
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Figure 2: Flame graph trace of call time, in samples, for single-packet runs
While we expect that a test suite would capture possi-
ble bugs in arbitrary logic and pointer references, there are
no abstractions within the programs themselves to ensure
the validity of fields and what values they can possibly be.
Furthermore, what if constants like MAX_PCKT_SIZE were
changed within the upstreammodule that instantiated them?
Leveraging static assertions like we do in our work could
benefit functions like the one shown here.
6.3 Next Steps
6.3.1 Deployment Models Throughout this paper, we’ve
explained how runtime assertions in our system are best used
during the design phase of programming NFs. Yet within the
ecosystem of network programming, our technique can be
extended beyond design and integration testing. We would
like to be able to turn on contracts automatically if our system
is running within an environment acting as a simulation net-
work, e.g. Mininet [22], or within production deployments
for certain kinds of traffic, e.g. probe packets sent for NF
monitoring or health checking.
6.3.2 Hinting and Feedback The major goal of our work
is aiding in the development of network programs, espe-
cially those that involve arbitrary complexity and interact
with changing dependencies. In our system, runtime errors
look akin to typical assertion errors presented by other lan-
guages or frameworks. Even though our errors include some
context—the expectation vs. what actually happened—they
normally do not articulate anything related to the specifi-
cation itself or what dependencies triggered it. We would
like to take a page from the recent work in program slicing
and compiler design (as demonstrated in languages like Elm
and Rust) and provide feedback via hints to the programmer
while they build out NFs during development.
Leverage static analysis of input programs In our
code generation step(s), we look for a set of explicit tokens
to rewrite and incorporate seamlessly within the context of a
given NF. However, by adding the check macro to a function,
we’re able to walk the entire AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) of
the input NF before it gets compiled, allowing us to perform
static analysis on the function to find bugs [16] at compile-
time. Further leveraging static analysis would allow us to
limit the need for certain runtime contracts.
Interactive feedback Good feedback is crucial when an
error occurs. Modern type systems provide more context
to type errors (beyond just which line propagated the error
itself), by suggesting more precise types for the developer
to include in their programs. In designing network function
paradigms, we want to build off our prototype and expand
to include helpful information about where contract errors
occur at the boundary and in which ways the errors may be
debugged.
7 Related Work
Our approach builds upon a growing literature on contract-
driven validation of programs. In Sections 1 and 3.1 we refer-
enced our inspiration from D’s contract programming model,
which was itself inspired by the system developed for Eif-
fel. Though our approach is unique within the field of pro-
grammable networks, contract programming has gained pop-
ularity as extensions to functional programming languages
like Clojure (via Spec [27]) and Racket [2]. Racket also in-
cludes mechanisms for generating contracts from macros.
Regarding type systems and ways to validate network
programs, we’ve already mentioned NetKat [3], which has
had follow-up pieces in literature, including probabilistic
variants [31]. Recently, p4v [23] was published and is moti-
vated by real-world examples; it attempts to find bugs in P4
programs and verify program properties by incorporating
domain-specific assumptions into a constraint solver.
Languages for network function specification exist within
industry, including TOSCA [28], a templating metamodel for
network function virtualization. Also related isAssert-P4 [13],
which is a proposed approach for checking P4 programs that
is also based on assertion checking. Combining assertions
with symbolic execution, it finds bugs motivated by con-
troller misconfiguration and code circumvention and gives
developers that ability to specify properties about their pro-
grams. Their work is very P4-specific and does not provide
examples of complex pipelines involving arbitrary depen-
dencies, similar to the cases we’ve discussed in this paper.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a hybrid-approach and implemen-
tation for checking and validating the arbitrary logic and
side effects typically part of network functions by combin-
ing design by contract, static assertions and type-checking,
and code generation via macros. We were able to build-out
and incorporate our technique within an existing network
function framework, without penalizing the developer or in-
creasing the complexity that they already have to handle. We
want to explore this space further and provide better tooling
and interaction models for anyone programming networks.
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